| Another Israeli | Businessman | Israel |
Re: ‘Syrian Israeli Peace Process’
Just as Olmert has become popular in Israel as the smell of Limburger cheese forgotten in a drawer for 6 months, the new peace process with Syria emerges. No wonder most Israelis view it as just additional Olmert spin aimed at trying to postpone the inevitable, early elections in Israel. If the Barak led Labor party buys into Olmert’s view that indeed the talks are serious, it may be reluctant to leave Olmert’s coalition and force early elections. Also, Olmert may be counting on support from parties outside his coalition (such as the Arab parties and left of Labor parties) to prop his government while peace talks with Syria are ongoing.
Most Israelis are not interested in Olmert’s short term woes and are asking the more fundamental question: What has Israel to gain from a peace agreement or peace process with Syria? Given the fact that Syria can neither disarm Hizballah nor cut its ties with Iran, what exactly is Israel getting in a peace deal? There are only two clear tangible benefits. The process with Syria will help move the Palestinian track forward at a faster pace. The Palestinians know that if Syria cuts a deal with Israel before they do, their position will be even weaker than it is now. The other tangible benefit from a peace deal would be Syria stopping its support of Hamas. As of now, Syria denies it is willing to do so but since it is not a Syrian vital interest, they may compromise on this issue. A third less clear benefit from a peace process may be the possibility that due to the interaction, Syria will be less likely to take part in a regional war once the US and Israel attack Iran.
Some supporters of the peace deal speak of many intangible security advantages, but no one has spelled those out. Given the reluctance of Syria to retaliate against the Israeli bombing of its presumed nuclear reactor and the assassination of Mugniyeh, it seems clear that in the next few years Syria itself would not be a security threat to Israel. As for Hizballah, the results of the July 2006 war and its preoccupation with internal Lebanese affairs guarantee many years of quiet on the Lebanese-Israeli border even though arms continue to flow from Syria to Hizballah without hindrance. At most, the intangible security benefits will be harvested in the future which raises the question as to why Israel should hurry now to sign a peace deal with Syria.
Israel’s losses from a peace agreement are serious and quite tangible. First, it will have to return the Golan, a piece of land which is valuable to Israelis from three different aspects: security wise, economically and emotionally. Second, Israel would provide legitimacy to a terror supporting dictator and delay democratic reforms in Syria for years to come.
Third, Israel may hinder the international investigation into the alleged Syrian nuclear program. Fourth, Israel will further alienate the majority of Syrians who are Sunnis and will therefore jeopardize its future relations with Syria once the Sunni majority manifests its political will. Fifth, Israel risks a confrontation with the US over its Syrian policy. Sixth, at this point in time, a peace process with Syria would undermine Saudi led Arab efforts to minimize Syrian interference in Lebanon.
Two new laws pertinent to the peace process are making their way through the Knesset. Fifty seven Knesset members have already signed their approval on an amendment to the Golan law stipulating that any change in the status of the Golan will require at least 80 supporting Knesset votes (out of 120). Another law that is likely to pass is one that requires a referendum to ratify any law or agreement changing the status of the Golan. As both Barak and Rabin promised such a referendum in the past, Olmert will likely have to agree to one even if the law requiring a referendum does not pass.
Weighing the gains and losses expected from the deal and given Olmert’s shaky coalition and the requirement to bring any deal to the Israeli people for approval, it is unlikely that Israel would sign any peace deal with Syria in the near future.
As for Syria, it is unlikely that it is interested in peace with Israel. It is much more interested in a peace process only and with peace (or at least a cease fire) with the US. As the self proclaimed leader of the Arab resistance, Asad has much to lose from a peace deal with Israel. “The fortress of opposition and confrontation, the beating heart of Arabism” (Syria as described by its own regime) sees itself as a regional power on par with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. Its current power comes from its ability to destabilize Lebanon, support Palestinian terror organizations and agitate the Arab street. Once a peace treaty is signed, where will Syrian power originate from? Syria is a third world country with an economy that will take decades to fix. Once a peace deal is signed, Syria’s power will diminish considerably. Even more saliently, a peace deal with Israel will endanger Asad’s regime. Without the excuse of the war with Israel as a shield against the dismal economic situation and with the mantle of the leader of the resistance gone, Asad will not be able to deflect the criticism of the Syrian people and will have to bear responsibility for their dire situation.
Given the above it seems that the peace process is the result of temporary convergence of interests of two besieged leaders but it is not a true change of perspectives that will lead to results.
(18 votes, average: 2.11 out of 5)
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