David Shagoury | Republican political analyst | United States |
Re: ‘Syria's foreign policy’
It has become trendy for certain Syrophiles, and most definitely Syrophobes to suggest that it should be inveterate in any progress on the Golan front for Syria to abandon its interests and its history in Lebanon. This is an insidious formula that is being put forward as almost self – evident in the hopes that such a radical new paradigm will be perceived as a long-standing assumption in the region, and hence a standard by which to judge Syria’ s worthiness to enter peace talks with Israel. Not only is the aforementioned a false paradigm that would have been previously viewed as laughable, but it is directly contravened by what emerged as a comprehensive consensus between all relevant parties during peace talks in the 90s.
When Syria and Israel were engaged in US sponsored, meaningful peace negotiations, no less than Israel itself (with the strong support of the US) enumerated its formal recognition of Syria’s special role in Lebanon. This Israeli recognition (which my country, USA, accepted years before) occurred for two specific reasons.
1) The position’s clear and unequivocal historic legitimacy
2) The position’s significant definitive strategic benefits to all regional parties and the US.
That said official recognition of a self evident truth also served to facilitate mid east peace and hence would be an immeasurably vital gift to all the peoples of the war weary region was an intended resultant.
Yet, the Israeli recognition of Syria’s special role in Lebanon was never tethered to a final agreement between Israel and Syria on Golan issues; nor should it be today.
There are ebbs and flows in geopolitics, especially in the middle east. But while current trends must by necessity be considered by states, and even compromised with to varying degrees, it cannot be a substitute for interests that are permanent. This aphorism is even more incontrovertible for weaker states such as Syria. Reasonable compromise may be strategically viable (talking peace with Israel was and is a worthy concession from past policies), but capitulation on the Lebanese issue will only bring derision, scorn and irrelevance upon a Syria with little else left in its quiver.
The recent past, due to a strong shift in American policy, has weakened Syria’s regional position, but while injured, Syria has resisted the temptation and coercion directed at it to abandon its permanent interests, and has proven itself not only quite resilient but also to the dismay of its political foes, still very relevant. If Syria now relents and allows itself to be marginalized in the Lebanon, the exemplification of a Syrian permanent interest, for benefits real or imagined in another front, it will most assuredly do so at its own peril.